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THE POSTMODERN KANTIANISM OF ARENDT

AND LYOTARD
DAVID INGRAM

[0]nly a redeemed mankind receives the fullness of its past?which

is to say, only for a redeemed mankind has its past become citable in
all its moments. Each moment it has lived becomes a citation ? Vordre

du jour?and that day is Judgment Day.1

Walter Benjamin

JL he past DECADE has witnessed an extraordinary resurgence of
interest in Kant's writings on aesthetics, politics, and history. On
the Continent much of this interest has centered on the debate be

tween modernism and postmodernism. Both sides of the debate
are in agreement that Kant's differentiation of cognitive, practical,
and aesthetic domains of rationality anticipated the fragmentation
of modern society into competing if not, as Weber assumed, opposed
lifestyles, activities, and value spheres, and that this has generated

a crisis of judgment. Tradition is deprived of its authority as a
common reference point for deliberation; judgment appears to be
all but submerged in the dark void of relativism. Yet, having both
accepted Kant's differentiation of reason as emblematic of the plu
ralism of modern life, modernists and postmodernists remain divided

in their response to its implications. Modernists?Habermas and
Arendt too, I believe, can be classified under this rubric?attempt
to circumvent the relativism of cultural fragmentation by appealing
to a universal ideal of community. This solution recalls Kant's own
grounding of judgments of taste in the notion of a sensus communis.

By contrast, postmodernists such as Lyotard embrace relativism.
Whereas the modernist emphasizes the capacity of rational agents

1 Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in Illu

minations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. H. Zohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
and World, 1968), 256.

Review of Metaphysics 42 (September 1988): 51-77. Copyright ? 1988 by the Review of

Metaphysics
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to rise above the parochial limits of local community in aspiring
toward an autonomous perspective, the postmodernist denies the
possibility of impartiality altogether, thus binding judgment to the

traditional constraints of practice.
This way of viewing the debate, I shall argue, neglects the fact
that the postmodernist, no less than the modernist, must acknowl
edge a higher community of discourse, and for two reasons: first,
because the constant state of revolution endemic to the postmodern
condition fosters an autonomous perspective oriented toward the
idea of indeterminacy and conflict, in short, toward plurality for its

own sake; second, because the affirmation of pluralism implies the
idea of a community wherein everyone agrees to disagree. If this
analysis is correct, the distinct advantage of the postmodernist po

sition would reside in its capacity to combine?in however para
doxical a manner?both practical and aesthetic moments of judg

ment: both the Aristotelian notion of phron?sis, or the application

of general rules heteronomously determined by local habits of
thought, and the Kantian notion of taste, or the free, reflexive dis
covery of rules in light of indeterminate, transcendent ideas of com

munity.
Taking the philosophies of Hannah Arendt and Jean-Fran?ois
Lyotard as representative of modernist and postmodernist responses
to the crisis of judgment respectively, I intend to show that neither

adequately explains the possibility of truthful evaluation. Whereas
the modernist approach escapes the dilemma of relativism only at
the cost of aestheticizing or depoliticizing judgment, the postmod
ernist alternative affirms the political reality of judgment by deliv

ering it to the vicissitudes of changing circumstance. I therefore
concur with Jean-Luc Nancy that judgment must ultimately be lo
cated in the prediscursive nexus of habits and meanings that pre
cedes propositionally differentiated language.
The first section reviews Kant's contribution to the debate, es
pecially his resolution of the conflict between theoretical and prac

tical reason in the third Critique. The mediation of nature and

freedom in aesthetic judgment is of cardinal importance for Arendt

and Lyotard since it provides them with a non-teleological model
for reconciling the standpoints of actor and philosopher-spectator.
In addition, the judgmental disclosure of analogical relationships
between distinct fields of rationality suggests a possible grounding
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for philosophical rationality which, as we shall later see, is exploited

to good advantage by Lyotard. Clearly, the delimitation of fields
of rationality undertaken by the critical philosopher cannot be
grounded exclusively in any particular field. Philosophical no less
than aesthetic judgment must remain autonomous, or detached from
particular theoretical and practical interests, since its aim is to reg

ulate in as impartial a manner as possible the conflict arising from
them. Such impartiality, however, can only be secured by invoking
a universal community of discourse. The second section discusses
Arendt's use of this principle in addressing the crisis of judgment
besetting the modern age. She is less concerned with the problem
of justifying global philosophical judgments about rightful bound
aries and more interested in the meaning of history. In particular,
she hopes to show how judgment can "redeem the past" without
resorting to teleological interpretations that deny the autonomy of
actor and spectator. The problem with this solution, which involves
transferring the model of aesthetic judgment developed by Kant to

the political and historical sphere, is that it ends up depoliticizing
judgment. The postmodern alternative of Lyotard discussed in the
third section seems to circumvent this difficulty in that it reinstates

the practical dimension of judgment (phron?sis) alongside the aes
thetic. However, the tension between these two poles is once again
resolved in favor of the aesthetic. Deprived of prescriptive force
and decentered (or, if one prefers, centered on a wholly indeterminate

ideal of community), judgment ceases to discriminate or discrimi
nates in a manner that constantly vacillates depending on local cir
cumstances. I conclude that this radical relativism can be mitigated
and the truthfulness of judgment accounted for only if one acknowl

edges the continuity of effective history as an ontological ground
supporting radical heterogeneity.

I
It is vexing to expositors of Kant that he left unclarified what
is arguably the most important concept in his philosophy: judgment.
Doubtless he meant many things by this term: a "faculty of thinking
the particular as contained under the universal," common to cog
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nitive, practical, and aesthetic modes of experience; a capacity for
finding analogical passageways linking these disparate modalities;
a distinct faculty of taste.2 It suffices to note for our purposes that,
notwithstanding its designated role within Kant's system, a species

of judgment was identified by him that may be described as evalu
ative in the broadest sense of the term and one, moreover, that he
himself thought to exercise in coming to grips with the political
events of his day. The most detailed discussion of judgment occurs
in the Critique of Judgment, where it is introduced in conjunction
with two problems.3 The former concerns the need to bridge the
"immeasurable gulf" separating "the sensible realm of nature and
the supersensible realm of the concept of reason." This "gulf" was
a by-product of Kant's famed resolution of the problem of free will
and determinism in the Critique of Pure Reason. Since understand
ing (the faculty of natural concepts responsible for causality) and
reason (the faculty of supersensible ideas responsible for freedom)
have their source in the subject, it is entirely possible, Kant con
cluded, that they exercise, "two distinct legislations on one and the
same territory of experience without prejudice to each other" (CJ,
12). He later realized, however, that this resolution of the problem
was not entirely satisfactory, for the categorical distinction between
heterogeneous orders of reality, phenomena and noumena, belies the
integral experience of the embodied moral agent for whom "the
concept of freedom is meant to actualize in the world of sense the

purpose proposed by its laws." Nature, Kant reasoned, "must be
so thought that the conformity to law of its (causal) form at least
harmonizes with the possibility of the purposes to be effected in it
according to laws of freedom" (CJ, 11-12). Somehow we have to
imagine the possibility of a supersensible ground of freely willed
purposes producing causal effects in nature. Though such produc
tion is beyond our ken, Kant insisted that it is presupposed whenever
we try to explain a complex event in terms of natural teleology or
judge nature to be beautiful. As regards the latter case?of signal

2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (London:

MacMillan, 1951), 15. Hereafter abbreviated as 'CJ'.
3 Aside from occasional references to judgment in Kant's Logic, his
essay "Theory and Practice," and his treatise, Education, a more detailed
discussion of this faculty and its relationship to taste can be found in
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.
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importance for understanding the possibility of a global judgment
capable of delimiting the rightful boundaries of distinct domains of
action and discourse?the underlying feeling of pleasure announces
a kind of harmony between understanding and reason arising from
the non-cognizable purposiveness of nature with respect to our sub
jectivity.
As a solution to the conflict of faculties this appeal to taste
seems at first highly disingenuous since evaluative judgments are
one and all subjective. The tendency to conclude that judgments
of this type are merely arbitrary opinions is nonetheless resisted
by Kant, who follows Shaftesbury and Burke in defending their pre
sumption of inter subjective validity. It would be folly, Kant notes,
to reprove another person's judgment of what is gratifying in an
immediate, non-reflective way, since "as regards the pleasant. . .
the fundamental proposition is valid: everyone has his own taste
(the taste of sense)." Thus "he is quite contented that if he says
'Canary wine is pleasant,' another man may correct his expression
and remind him that he ought to say, 'It is pleasant to me.' " It is
otherwise in the case of pure aesthetic judgments:
Many things may have charm and pleasantness?no one troubles

himself at that?but if he gives out anything as beautiful, he supposes
in others the same satisfaction; he judges not merely for himself, but
for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things.
Hence he says, "The thing is beautiful," and he does not count on the
agreement of others with this his judgment of satisfaction, because
he has found this agreement several times before, but he demands it

of them. (CJ, 46-47)

Judgments of taste, then, are at once evaluative and cognitive, that
is, they refer a subjective feeling to an object in a manner conducive
to bringing about an expectation of universal agreement. However,
unlike judgments of the good, which produce similar expectations,

the ground of aesthetic judgments cannot be conceptually repre
sented and objectively demonstrated; one cannot show that a paint
ing is beautiful in the same way that one can show that a saw is
useful, a square perfect, an action worthy, or an end universalizable.
For to say that something is beautiful is to say nothing at all about
its possible utility, worthiness, perfection, or purposiveness with
respect to any conceivable end.
But how can judgment lay claim to universal validity if its source
is subjective pleasure? One might suppose that an appeal to tran
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scendental grounds would help here, for on Kant's reading of the
matter, transcendental judgments attributing categorical properties
to objects have their origin in the subject too. The appeal can be
made but not, Kant adds, without encountering difficulties arising
from the peculiar reflexivity that distinguishes aesthetic from cat
egorical judgments. The categorical properties predicated of objects
of knowledge, such as causality and substance, can be proven to be
universally and necessarily valid as a priori conditions for the pos
sibility of objectivity. Ascriptions of this sort are instances of what

Kant calls determinant judgment, or predication which subsumes a
particular under a pre-given universal. Judgments of taste clearly
do not determine their object in this way; one does not judge this
diamond to be beautiful because it has been universally established
in advance that all diamonds are beautiful. Rather, one judges it
so only after associating its particular formal attributes with feel
ings of pleasure. Stated differently, such reflective judgments dis
cover the universal (or the beautiful, or the sublime) which best
captures our subjective response to a given particular.
For Kant, it is the disinterested contemplation of an object solely
in regard to its pure form alone independent of any purpose it might

serve (be it subjective gratification of the senses or objective con
formity to some concept) that suggests a way out of the grounding
dilemma. Might there not be a priori formal conditions of aesthetic
pleasure analogous to the formal unity of cognitive faculties under
lying the possibility of objective knowledge? The deduction of such
a ground cannot, of course, aspire to rigorous demonstration in ac
cordance with concepts or other determinate criteria, since we are
here talking about the exemplary necessity and universality of cer
tain subjective states of pleasure?our general feeling that all per
sons of disinterested mind ought to agree in matters of taste?not

the apodeicticity of categories of possible objective knowledge.
What is at issue here is the existence of a common sense (sensus
communis) which enables feelings to be communicated as universally

as cognitions. According to Kant, there would be no agreement in
people's feelings or cognitions unless they shared the same cognitive
faculties and the same "state of mind" affected by acts of judgment
(CJ, 75-76). Now judgment involves the subsumption of a particular
under a universal, a process bringing into play the imagination (the

faculty of representing sensible intuitions) and the understanding
(the faculty of concepts). As for logical judgments of cognition, or
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judgments which ascribe a universal property such as causality to
a particular object, a sensible intuition is schematized by the faculty
of imagination in prior conformity to the laws of the understanding.
In the case of aesthetic judgments, however, the predicate ascribed
to the object does not refer to an objective concept, but to a subjective

feeling. Here the formal unity of understanding and imagination
is not predetermined by understanding. Instead, the imagination,
representing only the mere form of a particular intuition apart from

any sensuous or conceptual content, harmonizes with the under
standing spontaneously (CJ, 128-32).
The feeling of pleasure arising from the free play of cognitive
faculties permits us to judge the subjective purposiveness, or beauty,
of an object in a manner that leads Kant to formulate a new solution
to the conflict of faculties. Not only is the imagination in its freedom
harmonized with the understanding in its conformity to law, but as

Kant later notes, beauty?especially natural beauty?can also be
said to symbolize, and thereby harmonize with, morality. For Kant,
symbols function as indirect representations and, more specifically,

as concrete analogues of rational ideas to which no direct sensible
intuition corresponds. In his opinion, nature in the wild, indepen
dent of any conceptual or utilitarian associations, excites those pure
aesthetic feelings whose underlying formal structure?implicating,

free, immediate, universal, and disinterested pleasure?is analogous
to the feeling of respect accompanying our fulfillment of moral duty.

Hence there is a sense in which the symbolizing of moral ideas such
as freedom and the kingdom of ends by means of aesthetic "ideas"
implies a supersensible ground (sometimes referred to as Geist)

identifiable with neither nature nor freedom taken singly

(CJ, 196-99).

II
Those who have followed the discussion thus far may well won
der what Kant's aesthetics has got to do with postmodern political
thought. To begin with, the conflict between theoretical and prac
tical reason motivating much of Kant's discussion of judgment crops
up again in the postmodernism debate. True, one no longer talks
about reason per se, yet the issue of fragmentation and conflict?in
this case involving domains of discourse and action?is the same.
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Two questions arise concerning this fragmentation: What place does
philosophy occupy in this scheme? And to whom can the political
actor appeal in deciding what is right? Lyotard is interested prin
cipally in the former, that is, he is concerned with the legitimacy of
a discipline that aspires to the status of an impartial tribunal reg
ulating the rightful boundaries of heterogeneous language games.

In particular he wonders whether it makes sense to appeal to a
transcendent (or transcendental) notion of reason, or community,
in defending philosophy's right to judge in these matters. If the
philosopher, like the aesthetician, must judge without claiming a
privileged standpoint outside the relativity of language games and
must discover at each moment the universal which best fits the par
ticular case independent of determinate criteria, then whatever reg
ulative idea he or she invokes must necessarily remain formal and
empty. Perhaps a universal ideal of community is operational here,
but if so, what kind? One conforming to the harmonistic model

underwriting judgments of beauty or one conforming to the
transgressional aesthetics of the sublime? Lyotard, as we shall see,
hopes to avoid a politics of terror (or totalitarianism) by opting for
the latter. The second question is of concern to both Lyotard and
Arendt, though it is Arendt who initially formulated it. Given the
unreliability of conventional authority and the constraints of action
in the modern age, is it not wiser (contra Lyotard) to reserve judg

ment to the spectator whose aesthetic distance on life secures a
semblance of impartiality? If so, then would such a notion not
imply something like an ideal community of speakers capable of
agreeing with one another?
I shall begin with Arendt's diagnosis of modernity, which fo
cuses on the devastating impact the Industrial Revolution had on
traditional societies "held together only by customs and traditions."4

This impact was immediately registered in the degradation of cul
tural goods to the status of exchange values serving the social as
pirations of philistine parvenus. With the advent of mass society,
concern with cultural fabrication (work) gave way to the functional

production of entertainment and other consumer goods (labor).
4 Arendt, "Understanding and Politics," Partisan Review 20 (1953):
385. The reader is urged to consult Ronald Beiner, "Interpretative Essay"
in Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner, (Chi

cago: Chicago University Press, 1982).
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Absorption of culture into the life process was not without political

implications since the public sphere?the stage on which the drama
of political life is acted out and recorded before an audience of spec
tator-judges?is itself constituted by the narratives, artistic images,
and other cultural artifacts that lend it permanence:
Culture indicates that art and politics, their conflicts and tensions
notwithstanding, are interrelated and even mutually dependent. . . .
[T]he fleeting greatness of word and deed can endure in the world to
the extent that beauty is bestowed upon it. Without the beauty, that
is, the radiant glory in which potential immortality is made manifest
in the human world, all human life would be futile and no greatness

could endure.5

Inasmuch as political action depends for its enduring appearance,
its meaning and purpose, on the sound judgment and judicious un
derstanding of a public, the "crisis in culture" is a political crisis as

well. Gone is the man of action, replaced by a mass man whose
"capacity for consumption [is] accompanied by inability to judge, or

even to distinguish."6
Symptomatic, too, of the crisis in culture is the widespread dis

semination of scientific and technological modes of thought. The
rational questioning of cultural tradition and authority and the con
comitant spread of what, since Nietzsche, has come to be known as

nihilism?scepticism regarding the existence of absolutes, deval
uation of values claiming universal assent, and resignation to a life
devoid of meaning and purpose?has had the further consequence
of depriving judgment of any reliable standards. In conjunction
with the rise of state bureaucracy devoted to global economic man
agement, the demise of community based on shared values and the
attendant withering away of common sense also play important roles
in Arendt's account of the emergence of totalitarianism. Having
"clearly exploded our categories of political thought and our stan
dards of moral judgment," totalitarianism challenges not only the
capacity of the actor to discern right from wrong, but also the ca
pacity of the historian to understand.7
The Eichmann trial in the sixties seemed to confirm her thesis.

5 Arendt, "The Crisis in Culture," in Between Past and Future (New
York: Viking Press, 1980), 218.
6 Ibid., 199.
7 Arendt, "Understanding and Politics," 379.
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Not Eichmann's diabolical nature (if he possessed one) but his banal
thoughtlessness, his failure to engage in responsible judgment by
blindly obeying the orders of others, was the root cause of his evil.
Consequently, Arendt felt that it was all the more imperative that

we ascribe to each and everyone "an independent human faculty,
unsupported by law and public opinion, that judges anew in full
spontaneity every deed and interest whenever the occasion arises."8
But how can one judge or understand the unprecedented inhumanity

of totalitarianism? What gives the historian the right to judge
actions whose circumstances are so novel as to defy comprehension?
Is not the actor better qualified to judge than the historian? This
question was raised by Gershom Scholem with regard to Arendt's
harsh judgment of those Jewish Elders who had urged compliance
with Nazi authorities. Had she not presumed first-hand knowledge
of their plight? While conceding that it might be too early for a
"balanced judgment," Arendt replied that "the argument that we
cannot judge if we were not present and involved ourselves seems
to convince everyone, although it seems obvious that if it were true,
neither the administration of justice nor the writing of history would

be possible."9 The moral of this story is that if the historian must
judge, the actor must understand, or insert his or her own judgments
into the broader framework of a community of persons united by

common narratives, meanings, and goals. Eichmann was evil be

cause he lacked the imagination to take into account other persons'
interests save those of his own chosen company.10 In the words of
Arendt, "understanding becomes the other side of [political] action"
engaged in making a new beginning, for one must "eventually come
to terms with what irrevocably happened and to what unavoidably
exists," including, one would think, the provenance of one's own
identity and that of the community to which one belongs.11
A crisis of meaning and judgment likewise clouds political action

8 Arendt, "Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship," The Listener,

August 6,1964,185-87.

9 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil
(New York: Viking Press, 1965), 295-96.
10 Arendt, "Basic Moral Propositions" (Course given at the University
of Chicago, Seventeenth Session), Hannah Arendt Papers, Library of Con
gress, Container 41, p. 024560. Cited by Beiner in Arendt, Lectures on
Kant's Political Philosophy, 112.
11 Arendt, "Understanding and Politics," 391.
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aimed at initiating fundamental change. To appreciate the role of
understanding in coming to terms with action of this sort one must
turn to Arendt's transcription of Kant's system in The Life of the

Mind. After treating the vita activa?the life of labor, work, and
political action?in The Human Condition, Arendt returned to some
of her earlier concerns pertaining to thinking, willing, and judg
ment?the triad comprising the vita contemplativa, or "life of mind,"

modeled on Kant's three Critiques. Kant's distinction between Ver
nunft and Verstand is preserved in her distinction between thought,

which "deals with invisibles, with representations of things that
are absent" (the combined capacities of abstraction, critical reflec
tion, and imaginative reproduction and synthesis) and intellect,
which involves the necessary conditions for cognition.12 Thinking
endows life with meaning by weaving experience into a coherent
narrative; cognition, which depends on thinking, aims at demon
strable truth. The other, non-cognitive faculties of mental life?

willing and judging?are also dependent on (but irreducible to)
thinking.
Now Arendt no less than Kant must contend with the conflict
of faculties. The freedom to initiate fundamental political change

imposes a responsibility?the need to legitimate the new order?

that can only be accomplished by situating the founding act within
a historical narrative connecting it to a prior foundation in the past.13

12 Arendt, Thinking, vol. 1 of The Life of the Mind, ed. Mary McCarthy
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1978), 193.
13 Arendt's claim that the secular orders founded by the framers of
the Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of the Rights of Man
required legitimation vis-?-vis the civic ideals of classical antiquity lends
credence to the view that the modern age is a continuation of the past by
other means. This secularization thesis, which denies modernity any claim
to legitimacy other than that bestowed upon it in virtue of its substantial
identity with the paganism of antiquity and the Christianity of the Middle

Ages, would appear to contradict Arendt's contention that the modern
world constitutes a radical break with the past. However, as Hans Blu
menberg notes, Arendt correctly saw that the worldliness of the modern
age is no more a simple repetition of pagan antiquity than is the unworld
iness of the scientific demythologization of nature a simple repetition of
the otherworldliness of the Middle Ages. See Arendt, On Revolution (New

York: Viking Press, 1962), 195-215; The Human Condition (Chicago: Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 1958), 320; and Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy
of the Modem Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,

1983), 8-9.

This content downloaded from
73.9.95.120 on Thu, 27 Oct 2022 12:35:34 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

61

DAVID INGRAM

62

One is tempted to recount a story of progress in which the revolu
tionary event is justified as inevitable or necessary, but this cannot
be done without denying freedom of the will. Two alternatives re
main: one resigns oneself to nihilism or redeems the meaningfulness

of the past (along with hope in the future) without any appeal to
ultimate ends. Nietzsche, in Arendt's opinion, tried to do both and
failed. According to Nietzsche, in order for the will to affirm nihil

ism as a positive expression of its freedom and power it would (so
it seems) have to deny the past?that residue of congealed meaning
weighing upon the present and future like a "stone." "Powerless

against what has been done," the will, Nietzsche tells us, "is an
angry spectator of all that is past."14 Short of denying time itself
(which would usher in the extinction of the will), Nietzsche can only
affirm its inherent purposelessness?the "innocence of all Becom
ing"?in the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence.15 A better solution?
one which does not end up denying the temporal openness necessary
for freedom?would require redeeming each moment of the past by
disinterested judgment.

At this juncture Arendt turns to Kant. She here notes two
ways in which he sought to apply the concept of judgment in order
to retrieve meaning out of political chaos, each demarcating distinct

philosophies of history. The first departs from the central tenets
of the Critique of Practical Reason: we are enjoined by practical
reason to strive for moral perfection; such a state presupposes the
realization of a universal kingdom of self-legislating agents regarded

as ends in themselves?an ideal condition that cannot be attained
by imperfect, mortal beings; yet "ought" implies "can"?we can only
be obligated to strive for what we have reasonable hope of attaining;
hence, we must postulate as regulative ideas the immortality of the
soul and divine providence. The pursuit of moral perfection on earth
is taken up further in Kant's miscellaneous writings on history,
where he argues that the achievement of a cosmopolitan federation
of republics in a state of "perpetual peace" is a precondition for the
free exercise of practical reason (CJ, 284). The question is posed
whether we have any reason to hope that such a state can be brought

14 Frederick Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in The Portable

Nietzsche, trans, and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1968),

251.

15 Arendt, Willing, vol. 2 of The Life of the Mind, 170.
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about by a species naturally inclined to pursue its own selfish in
terests. For the moral agent caught up in the vicissitudes of action,
the answer would appear to be negative.16 However, from the van

tage point of the spectator-judge surveying the totality of human
history, the situation is quite different. The basis for this optimism
(following the strategy outlined above) resides in the Idea of nature

as a supersensible realm of final ends. In response to the question
raised in the second half of the third Critique?Why is it necessary
that man should exist at all??Kant defends the view that humanity,
like any other class of living things, must ultimately be accounted

for in terms of teleology, since "absolutely no human reason . . .
can hope to explain the production of even a blade of grass by mere

mechanical causes" (CJ, 258). On this reading, our natural self
interestedness is judged to be so providentially designed as to force
us out of a state of nature (which Kant, following Hobbes, conceives

as a state of war) and into a political condition compelling lawful
behavior culminating in "a moral predisposition." Man's natural
"unsocial sociability" is here understood as causally effecting the
progressive advent of an unnatural (i.e., moral) state of peace and
harmony in accordance with an Idea of reason. It is this teleolog
ically based interpretation of natural history, then, which perhaps
explains how Kant could wax enthusiastic over the sublimity of the
French Revolution as a symbol of eternal moral progress while yet
condemning the lawlessness of its leaders.17
The appeal to reason notwithstanding, Arendt finds this use of
teleological judgment in resolving the dilemma of nature and free
dom, and explaining the superior insight of the philosopher-historian
questionable, since it relegates moral agents to the undignified status

of means in attaining prior ends.18 Elsewhere, however, the aes

16 Kant, "Theory and Practice," in Kant's Political Writings, ed. H.
Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971),

91.

17 Kant, "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Con

stantly Progressing?" part 2 of "The Strife of the Faculties," in On History,

ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 144. For a more
detailed account of Kant's condemnation of revolution in general and the
French Revolution in particular, see Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of
Justice, trans. John Ladd (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) 84-89, 113

14.

18 Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, 18, 31.
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thetic strain prevails in Kant's conceptualization of historical judg
ment, and it is here, she believes, that the core of Kant's political
thought resides. The "wishful participation that borders closely
on enthusiasm" which Kant detects in his positive judgment of the
French Revolution is described as consisting in "simply the mode
of thinking of the spectators which reveals itself publicly in this
game of great transformations, and manifests such a general yet
disinterested sympathy for the players on one side against those on
the other, even at the risk that this partiality could become very
disadvantageous for them if discovered."19 Implicit in this descrip
tion is an aesthetics of judgment which Arendt characterizes as
essentially imaginative, dialogical, and communitarian.20 To begin
with, there is the idea that the aesthetic attitude of the spectator
is superior to the moral attitude of the actor. From the standpoint
of the actor revolution "is at all times unjust" since its success would

involve violating the principle of publicity. As Kant puts it, a

"maxim which I cannot divulge publicly without defeating my own
purpose must be kept secret if it is to succeed; and, if I cannot publicly
avow it without inevitably exciting general opposition to my project,

the . . . opposition which can be foreseen a priori is due only to the
injustice with which the maxim threatens everyone."21 This per
spective seems to clash with that of the spectator-judge for whom
the sublimity of the ends takes precedence over the ignominity of
the means?in this regard, at least, war is by no means a handmaiden
to the "commercial spirit. . . low selfishness, cowardice, and effem
inacy" wrought by a successful peace (CJ, 102). Arendt goes on to
say, however, that insofar as "publicness is already the criterion of
Tightness in (Kant's) moral philosophy," the opposition between the
practical and aesthetic standpoints and with it, "the conflict of pol
itics with morality," is partially resolved.22 The "political moralist,"
whom Kant sees as forging "a morality in such a way that it con
forms to the statesman's advantage," is the one who takes the narrow
view of history as a "mere mechanism of nature." The moral pol
itician, by contrast, is capable of viewing history, if not as a natural
process progressively striving to realize a final end, then at least as

19
20
21
22

Kant, Strife of the Faculties, 143.
Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, 66-67.
Kant, Perpetual Peace, in On History, 129-30.
Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, 19.
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a theater of moral purposes in which his or her own freedom is
tested and affirmed.23 In this instance the possibility of taking up
the moral standpoint, far from opposing the aesthetic distance of
the spectator-judge, actually presupposes it. Publicity not only be
comes the great regulator of moral action; it also anticipates an
ideal public of spectators who transform their solitary perspectives
by communicating with one another.

Arendt proceeds to unpack the meaning of this ideal in terms
of the disinterestedness of the spectator. Of the three "maxims of
common human understanding" mentioned by Kant?think for one
self; think from the standpoint of everyone else; and think consis
tently?it is the second, the maxim of "enlarged thought," that spe
cifically applies to the disinterestedness of the spectator's judgment.
A person of enlarged mind "detaches himself from subjective per
sonal conditions of his judgment, which cramp the minds of so many
others, and reflects upon his judgment from a universal standpoint
(which he can only determine by shifting his ground to the stand
point of others)" (CJ, 136-37). The importance of enlarged thought
for the problem of judgment hinges on the role of imagination. In

her earlier essay, "Understanding and Politics" (1953), Arendt

writes: "Imagination alone enables us to see things in their proper
perspective, to put that which is too close at a certain distance so
that we can see and understand it without bias or prejudice, to bridge

abysses of remoteness until we can see and understand everything
that is too far away from us as though it were our own affair."24
Imagination enables one to "represent something to oneself that is
no longer present"; thinking subjects the representation to the crit
ical dialogue of the mind. Judging, by contrast, does not deal with

representations (universal or otherwise) but "always concerns par
ticulars and things close to hand." Nonetheless, it is "the by-product
of the liberating effect of thinking" and "realizes thinking, makes
it manifest in the world of appearances."25 The thoughtful dis
tancing of imagination "cannot arise unless we are in a position to
forget ourselves, the cares and interests and urges of our lives, so
that we will not seize what we admire but let it be as it is, in its

23 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 119.
24 Arendt, "Understanding and Politics," 392.
25 Arendt, Thinking, 192-93.
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appearance."26 As Ernst Vollrath and Ronald Beiner have pointed
out, the kind of impartiality intended here should not be confused
with scientific objectivity.27 If anything, it is more kindred to phe
nomenological openness; things are to be judged afresh in all their
phenomenal richness and inexhaustible particularity without being
subsumed in advance under conventional universals or habitual
modes of classification. Still, without some mediation of universal
and particular neither perception nor judgment would be possible.
In the case of phenomenological description particular appearances
are elevated to the rank of exemplary universals (essences) through
a process of imaginative variation and eidetic intuition. Something
similar happens to particular events when judged; brought into relief

with the aid of narrative understanding and imaginatively inter
preted with an ideal audience in mind, human actions come to ex
emplify what is best or worst in us, what should or should not be
emulated. This is how "redemptive" judgment resolves the anti
nomy of freedom and necessity, willing and thinking; reconciliation
with the past is made possible by endowing the contingent particular

with intrinsic meaning and worth.
The work of imagination is captured further by Kant in terms
of an ideal community, or audience of interpreters who are thought

of as striving to reach impartial agreement and mutual under
standing:
[U]nder the sensus communis we must include the idea of a sense

common to all, i.e., of a faculty of judgment which, in its reflection,

takes into account (a priori) the mode of representation of all other
men in thought, in order, as it were, to compare its judgment with
the collective reason of humanity . . . This is done by comparing our
judgment with the possible rather than the actual judgments of others,
and by putting ourselves in the place of any other man, by abstracting
from the limitations which contingently attach to our own judgment.

(CJ, 136)

Implicit reference is here made to the importance of publicity. In
Kant's opinion, it is not enough to possess a right to the private use
of one's reason, for even the most conscientious exercise of judgment

will be biased unless it is exposed to public examination. Hence,
26 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 210.
27 Cf. Beiner, "Interpretive Essay," 111; and Ernst Vollrath, "Hannah

Arendt and the Method of Political Thinking," Social Research 44 (1977):

163-64.
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the principle of aesthetic judgment has as its corollary freedom of
speech and press.28

Ill
One wonders just how successful Arendt's reconstruction of
Kant's "other" political philosophy is in dealing with the crisis of
judgment symptomatic of the postmodern condition. If the post
modern condition renders reason and tradition equally suspect as
authoritative reference points for judgment, then what can be the
basis for saying that the standpoint of the spectator is any better
than that of the actor? Can community still provide an "impartial"
touchstone for judging our fragmented, alienated, and anomic con
dition? Before answering this question I would like to return again
to Arendt's choice of Kant's aesthetics as a model of political judg
ment. This model, as we have seen, privileges the standpoint of the
spectator over that of the actor. Although she herself would like
to believe that the perspectives of actor and spectator coincide, it is
clear from her own remarks that such is not really the case. Though
both categorical imperative and sensus communis enjoin the univer

salizability of perspectives, the former compels the judgment of
particular actions in isolation from unintended consequences, the
latter does not. Interestingly, some of Arendt's earlier writings
anticipate a way out of this dilemma in their fusion of Aristotelian
and Kantian motifs. In "The Crisis in Culture," for example, Arendt
discusses the role of phron?sis in judgment:
That the capacity to judge is a specifically political ability in exactly
the sense denoted by Kant, namely the ability to see things not only
from one's own point of view but in the perspective of all those who
happen to be present, even that judgment may be one of the funda
mental abilities of man as a political being insofar as it enables him
to orient himself in the public realm, in the common world.. . . The
Greeks called this ability phron?sis, or insight, and they considered
it the principal virtue or excellence of the statesman in distinction
from the wisdom of the philosopher.29

28 Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, 74-75. Cf. Kant,
"Was hei?t: Sich im Denken orientieren?" in Gesammelte Schriften, Prus
sian Academy edition (Berlin: Reimer & de Gruyter, 1910-66), vol. 8,131
47. Cf. Kant, On History, 89,103-03.
29 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 221.
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The juxtaposition of Aristotelian and Kantian motifs is quite
surprising given Kant's own conviction that prudence, or prudentia
(following Aquinas's Latin translation of phron?sis), ought to be
excluded from the moral-political realm as a "heteronomous" ex
ercise of will. This decision rests on narrowly interpreting the pru
dence of the "political moralist" as a purely theoretical (or technical
practical) skill involving the calculation of means for efficiently
bringing about desired ends, such as "exercising an influence over
men and their wills" for the sake of advancing interests of state
(CJ, 8). Aristotle, however, was careful to distinguish phron?sis
from techn? and epist?m?, and accorded it the title of practical wis

dom, by which he meant deliberation over ends as well as means.
This activity clearly has certain features in common with Kant's
notion of reflective judgment; it is "concerned with particulars as
well as universals," not simply in order to subsume the particular
under the universal (application), but to discover the universal, or
rather, the proper mean, appropriate to a given situation; and its
exercise involves considering the good of the community as well as
one's own.30 One reflects on the particular situation and the opinion
of one's fellow citizens in qualifying the universal, and in this regard,

at least, prudence is more open to the particular and less rigidly
determined by the universal than Kant's "law-testing" approach to
moral judgment" (as Hegel referred to it). Still, it is quite opposed
to Kant's notion of reflective judgment in its focus on the substantive

qualifications of statesmanship?experience, cultivation of virtuous
character, formation of sound habits, and so on?which, presuppos
ing active membership within local political communities bound by
common customs, cannot fulfill ideal conditions of impartiality,
universalizability, and autonomy.31
30 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2-4, 7-9.

31 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 220-21. Substantive consider
ations, however, do enter into the account of judgment and social taste
presented in Kant's Anthropology. There, judgment ("the faculty of dis
covering the particular so far as it is an instance of a rule") is similar to
Aristotle's golden mean in that it involves correct understanding, which
"maintains the properness of concepts necessary for the purpose for which

they are used" (Kant, Anthropology, 92). Such discrimination "cannot be
taught, but only exercised," and "does not come for years" (ibid., 93).
Elsewhere, Kant talks about the "goodness of soul. . . around which the
judgment of taste assembles all its judgments" as the "pure form under
which all purposes must be united." But "greatness of soul and strength
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One wonders why Arendt ever abandoned this classical concep
tion of judgment, since it comports much better with the presumed
truthfulness of political opinion?a presumption whose basis resides
in the shared convictions of a community rather than in the dem
onstrations of moral theorists.32 Yet for a civilization whose identity
has become so abstract as to verge on total disintegration, the only
community capable of serving as touchstone for judgment may well

be that disinterested ideal mentioned by Kant. Despite formalistic
shortcomings, the "aestheticization" and concomitant "depolitici
zation" of sensus communis for which Gadamer rebukes Kant is
possibly a better gauge of how things really stand with us than he
or any other neo-Aristotelian would care to admit.33
Now, no contemporary thinker of repute has capitalized on this
aspect of Kant's thought to the extent that Lyotard has. The aesth
eticization of science and politics which his philosophy proclaims is
clearly descended from that great fragmentation of value spheres
animating German thought since Kant. Yet notwithstanding the
somewhat cynical manner in which Lyotard embraces the debase
ment of value to exchange commodity, his otherwise positive, Nietz
schean paean to iconoclasm and innovation is at least tempered by

of soul relate to the matter (the tools for certain purposes)" (ibid., 144).
Finally, Kant remarks that "to be well-mannered, proper, polite, and pol
ished (by disposing of crudeness)" is a condition of taste, albeit a negative
one (ibid., 147).
32 Echoing Habermas's criticism of Arendt's contention that "practice
rests on opinions that cannot be true or false in the strict sense" (J?rgen
Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Communicative Concept of Power," Social
Research 44 [1977]: 22), Beiner remarks that "it is not clear how we could
make sense of opinions that did not involve any cognitive claims ... or
why we should be expected to take seriously opinions that assert no claims
to truth (or do not at least claim more truth than is claimed by available
alternative opinions)" ("Interpretive Essay," 137). Interestingly, in her
essay, "What is Freedom," Arendt followed Kant very closely in speaking
of "the judgment of the intellect which precedes action" (Between Past and
Future, 156?emphasis added). However, in her unpublished lectures de
livered in 1965 and 1966 she reversed herself, identifying judgment with
the "arbitrating function" of the will. It was only after expressing doubts
about the status of judgment that she eventually aligned it with the non
cognitive vita contemplativa.
33 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (T?bingen:
J. C. B. Mohr, 1960), 39-77. For further discussion of the relevance of
phron?sis to the problem of hermeneutic application see pp. 295-307; and
David Ingram, "Hermeneutics and Truth," Journal of the British Society
for Phenomenology 15 (January 1984): 62-78.
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a strong moral proclivity which owes as much, perhaps, to the "pa
gan" notion of phron?sis as it does to the modern deontological ethics
of Kant. This postmodern disrespect for stylistic boundaries, whose
very eclecticism mocks the rational demand for consistency, purity,
and progress, would appear to put Lyotard on the side of relativism
were it not for his retrieval?highly uncharacteristic of most post
structuralism?of universal notions of justice and judgment.
I will not bother repeating what I have said elsewhere about
Lyotard's vision of postmodern society.34 It suffices to note that the
fragmentation of persons and institutions into so many atomic roles

and incommensurable language games bears witness to a new le
gitimation crisis. According to Lyotard, the local nature of radically
incommensurable language games essentially frustrates any attempt
to uncover overarching rules of communication. Indeed the rules
internally regulating any given language game are themselves con
tinually contested; for in science as in daily life, conflicts between
competing descriptive, prescriptive, and expressive language games
go well beyond inducing the sorts of innovations generated within
the rules of normal discourse.35 Since the postmodern condition
fosters an incessant search for the new, the unknown, the anomolous,

the subversive, the eclectic?in short, dissent from dominant con
ventions and decentralization of subjectivity?Lyotard concludes
that only a "legitimation by paralogy" can satisfy "both the desire
for justice and the desire for the unknown."36 Consequently, the
democratic demand that social practices conform to a universally
binding consensus as a condition of their legitimation?the mod
ernist position defended by Habermas and Arendt?strikes him as
nothing less than totalitarian.
What are the implications of this analysis for a theory of judg
ment? Because there is no overarching community of discourse
Lyotard maintains that judgment is bound by conventional stan
dards of taste possessing at most local validity. The accent here is

34 See David Ingram, "Legitimacy and the Postmodern Condition: The

Political Thought of Jean-Fran?ois Lyotard," Praxis International (forth

coming). See also Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on

Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1984); and Lyotard and Jean-Loup Th?baud, Au juste
(Paris: Christian Bourgeois, 1979), 188.
35 Lyotard, Postmodern Condition, 20.
36 Ibid., 65-67.
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on competencies related to phron?sis; since standards are general?
prescribing only the limits of possible judgment?their application
in any given situation and, therewith, their specific meaning and
validity, will also be undetermined, at least with respect to these
limits. It is at this juncture, however, where practical (pagan) com
petencies for judgment and action lead to a more modern, aesthe
ticized notion of the Kantian type. The heteronomy (habitualness)
and parochiality (determinateness) of conventional judgment is it
self permanently relativized vis-?-vis the judge's freedom to rein
terpret the content of standards. As Lyotard puts it, "the veritable
nature of the judge is just to pronounce judgments, hence prescrip
tions, without criteria."37 In other words, the limits which imme
diately determine judgment are violated as soon as they are imag
inatively reinterpreted in light of an indefinite horizon of possible

situations. This spectatorial horizon is likened by Lyotard to a
regulative idea which postulates neither the convergence of all pos
sible judgments nor the universalizability of any standard, but only
the autonomy of judgment?its capacity to "maximize opinions," or

generate new possibilities.38 If a communitarian ideal is implicated
here it is that wherein the plurality of voices (or language games)
would be preserved without the violence of hegemony.
Lyotard first hinted at combining Aristotelian and Kantian no
tions of judgment in his 1979 interview with Jean-Loup Th?baud.
Shortly thereafter critics such as Jean-Luc Nancy pointed out the
paradox inherent in this position. Defending an Aristotelian per
spective, Lyotard denied any possibility of grounding judgments
claiming universal validity. Yet his self-acknowledged willingness
to play "the great prescriber" who judges the proper limits governing

all language games from the detached perspective of the spectator
clearly presupposed such a possibility, otherwise his own critique
of scientism and discursive hegemony would have been without
foundation. Moreover, by prescribing very determinate boundaries
to the prescriptive and descriptive language games of morality and
science respectively he may have confused (so Nancy argues) deter
minant and reflective judgment.39 On this reading Lyotard over
37 Lyotard and Th?baud, Au juste, 52-53. Emphasis added.

38 Ibid., 146-53.

39 Jean-Luc Nancy, "Dies Irae," in La faculte d?juger (Paris: Les Edi

tions de Minuit, 1985), 13-14.
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stepped the boundaries of aesthetic judgment. The latter may well
be guided by an indeterminate idea of community, but this universal
is not of the order of something that can be prescribed as a definite

purpose to be striven for. Having thus succumbed to a kind of
transcendental illusion, Lyotard became entrapped in a totalitarian
logic of his own making?that of absolute pluralism.
One need not accept Nancy's contention that Lyotard confused
phron?sis and reflective judgment to see the problem implicit in
playing the "great prescriber." Even if, as Gadamer and other her
meneuticists have claimed, every valid application of a general rule
to a concrete situation involves reinterpreting the rule in light of
the peculiar circumstances of the situation while relativizing these
same circumstances with respect to an indeterminate ideal of com
munity, that is, even if every determinate judgment presupposes a
reflective judgment and vice versa, such application does not always

or necessarily entail prescription. This objection was finally ac
knowledged by Lyotard in Le diff?rend (1983) where he once again
returned to Kant in order to clarify the notion of a community of
heterogeneous faculties "without which (the partisans of consensus,
or beautiful harmony, or the partisans of conflict, or sublime incom

mensurability) would not even be able to agree that they are in
disagreement. "40 Lyotard's preferred symbol for this new conception

of community is an archipelago:
The faculty of judging would be at least in part like a ship owner or
an admiral who would launch from one island to another expeditions
destined to present to the one what they have found (discovered in
the old meaning of the term) in the other, and who could serve up to
the first some "as-if" intuition in order to validate it. This force of
intervention, war or commerce, hasn't any object, it has no island of
its own, but it requires a milieu, the sea, the archipelago, the principal
sea as the Aegean Sea was formerly named.41

The third Critique takes note of symbolic or analogical passages
(?berg?nge) linking what are otherwise heterogeneous moral, aes

thetic, and cognitive faculties. Lyotard curiously finds in this
"oceanic" simile something like a higher ground on which to base
the critical judgment of the philosopher?a common place (the sea)

40 Lyotard, Le diff?rend (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1983), 24-25.
41 Ibid., 190.
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in terms of which competing islands of discourse can be relativized

(located) with respect to their particular domains of validity?
though he characteristically interprets it in a manner that brings
into relief an underlying tension. In The Strife of the Faculties
(1798), Kant no longer conceived critical philosophy as a neutral
tribunal that delivers final verdicts (prescriptions) without incurring

new wrongs. We find instead the notion of a guardian who, while
not a litigant in the dispute, intervenes indirectly on behalf of the
weaker party by judging what is "just," or conducive to an agreement

to disagree. The dispute in question is the conflict of faculties?in
the first instance, between the "higher" university faculties of the
ology, law, and medicine and the "lower" faculty of philosophy; and

in the second, between opposed cognitive and practical mental fac
ulties laying claim to the same territory, human nature. One cannot
regulate the various injustices (or diff?rends, as Lyotard prefers to
call them) which arise when conflicting "discourses" range over the

same territory; at most, one can expose them by defending the
equally valid claim of the weaker party, the advocate of freedom,
against the apparently stronger claim of the dogmatist. The basis
for this peculiar judgment would thus appear to be that the conflict
of mental faculties?indeed, the very sickness of the distracted sub
ject?may yet be conducive to the health of the soul.
For Lyotard the kind of critical judgment exercised by the phi
losopher is reflective rather than determinate, aesthetic rather than
teleological. It is not restricted to any given locale (or discursive
regime) but ranges over an entire "archipelago." Nor is it guided
in advance by any theoretical or practical notion of finality. What
guides this judgment are aesthetic considerations pertaining to the
integrity of a whole whose parts achieve harmonious equilibrium
only through conflict. This is not a judgment of beauty in Kant's
sense, but a judgment of the sublime. Whereas judgments of beauty
reflect the imagination's success in discovering symbols which rep
resent ideas of reason and attest to the unity of faculties?the unity
of the cognitive and the practical in the supersensible Idea of nature
being a case in point?judgments of the sublime articulate just the
opposite?the incommensurablity of imagination and understand
ing, the presentation of the unpresentable. Sublime for Kant are
those experiences of formlessness, boundlessness, and lack of finality
such as political revolutions, which paradoxically arouse enthusiasm
in us because they manage in spite of themselves to signal the finality

This content downloaded from
73.9.95.120 on Thu, 27 Oct 2022 12:35:34 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

74

DAVID INGRAM

and community they empirically deny.42 Sublime, too, is the lack
of finality evident in the diff?rend since it symbolizes a community
in which conflict is the basis for integrity, harmony, and justice.

Lyotard's philosophy therefore testifies to a justice of judgment
rather than of action and representation. As he puts it, "politics
cannot have for its stake the good, but would have to have the least

bad."43 By contrast, justice demands only that one judge without
prescribing, that one listen for the silences that betoken diff?rends
so as to finally let the suppressed voice find its proper idiom.44
Lyotard's refusal to grant judgment any prescriptive force fol

lows from the postmodern standpoint he shares with Arendt. If
Arendt and Lyotard do not exactly repudiate the finality of judg
ment, they certainly deny it any determinate content. In the ab
sence of any final verdicts we are left with little consolation but the

dignity that comes from judging responsibly. Arendt, of course,
found hope in a purely formal idea of community?one, she believed,

that might serve to regulate our search for mutual understanding
and reconciliation. Although Lyotard also embraces a formal ideal
of "community"?he like Arendt has long since abandoned the quest
for global narratives in favor of recounting the petit r?cits of local

izable collectivities?he more than she has been atuned to the pes
simistic implications of the current crisis. Having resigned himself
to the end of community as a locus of consensus, he urges acceptance
of the sublimely indeterminate, yet painful, spectacle of never-ending

conflict, disruption, and (it would seem) injustice. This solution
seems paradoxical in light of Lyotard's insistence on politicizing art
and philosophy; for if ideas of community and justice still find a
niche in his philosophy it is in the depoliticized sense of a healthy
equilibrium of heterogeneous discourses composed of discontinuous
phrases?a justice, if you will, of mutually cancelling injustices.
Once the sundering of the community of reason is accomplished,
however, philosophical judgment is left curiously suspended in an
oceanic void. Due to its extreme discrimination, judgment has de
prived itself of any determinate ground on which to discriminate,

42 Lyotard, Le diff?rend, 240-43.
43 Ibid., 203.
44 Ibid., 30.
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thereby perhaps explaining Lyotard's curious opinion that the only
appropriate response to linguistic fragmentation is silence. At least
Arendt continued to regard the function of judgment as in some
sense preserving a space for the disclosure of community and world.
Lyotard's rejection of the ontological no less than the practical role
of judgment, on the contrary, raises doubts about the normative
basis underlying his own critical judgment.45
Viewed in this light, Nancy's critique of Lyotard is decisive:
[Lyotard] posits "passages between 'areas' of legitimacy" such as

"language (which, if you will, is Being without illusion) in process (en
train) of establishing diverse families of legitimacy, critical language,

without rules." Language?that is to say, if I understand correctly,
the difference either of/between phrases?is defined "if you will" as
"Being without illusion." That is to say that illusion is to speak of

Being, but that speaking is Being "without illusion". ... It is in

process, it hasn't finished or begun, but it is in process ? la place.
What is this place? Lyotard would doubtless say that this question
is illegitimate. Let's say that he is right. But what is it to be right?
Ultimately it is not a "play of phrases" which decides what is right.
... If it is not "Being" it is at least that which happens to it, in fact
the truth of an experience, the judgment of a (hi)story. It is not
"phrases" that are "right".. . . Truth is not a phrase?and yet truth
happens.46

In situating this difficult passage one must bear in mind Lyotard's
insistance on the contextuality of all judgment. This would perhaps

45 Habermas also has difficulty accounting for the normative basis of

judgment, though for somewhat different reasons. He is inclined to dis

tinguish judgment from practical reason, the application of general norms
(phron?sis), from their discursive justification. Although his understand

ing of judgment is informed by Gadamer's hermeneutics, which invests

phron?sis with a certain reflexivity and dialogical openness, he is not willing
to see in it a different, perhaps aesthetic, conception of rationality at work.

The notion of aesthetic rationality in Habermas's philosophy is unclear,
but some of his recent essays have alluded to a kind of artistic rationality
and "truth" which would be holistic and prediscursive, implying more than

an ideal speech situation. See Habermas, "Questions and Counterques
tions," in Moralbewu?tsein und kommunikatives Handeln (Frankfurt:

Suhrkamp, 1983), 53-125; R. J. Bernstein, ed., Habermas and Modernity
(Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1985); and David Ingram, Habermas and the
Dialectic of Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 101-03,177

88.

60.

46 Jean-Luc Nancy, L?mperatif cat?gorique (Paris: Flammarion, 1983),
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explain the inconsistency of many of his own judgments in the Th?

baud interview about the rightful boundaries separating moral and
scientific discourse. Depending on the context of his own reasoning,
Lyotard argued both that prescription should be left out of science
and that scientific discourse is and even should be impure and un
decided. That the logical status of a scientific law or a rule of lan
guage hovers somewhere between the prescriptive and the descrip

tive is something to be at once praised as "paralogical" and con
demned as "terroristic." The resulting lack of centeredness and

discrimination conveys precisely the impression of sophistry Lyotard

seeks so assiduously to cultivate. Nancy's remark, I think, can be
understood as a response to the indeterminacy and ungroundedness
of this situation. Accepting much of Lyotard's thesis concerning
the postmodern condition, Nancy still prefers to read Kant through

the eyes of Arendt and Heidegger. Judgment is not an arbitrary
game of reversal, but presupposes some relationship to the truth,
however this is interpreted. Judging discloses Being?discriminates
and brings to light what there is. At the same time, it remains
firmly embedded in a form of life, or mode of being, that presupposes

a deeper, pre-thematic understanding of a global nexus of mean
ingful relationships comprising the always implicit background
against which one acts and experiences. This disclosure (or "truth"
as Heidegger would say) is already centered (enclosed or located)
within a linguistically determined horizon of possible meaning?
what Gadamer would call the "effective history" of past precedent
(tradition as a repository of possibilities)?and for that reason must
be distinguished from the sort of cognitive truth expressed in prop

ositional or categorical judgments. Kant, too, emphasized the cen
trality of judgment in bringing about the synthesis of intuition and
concept necessary for the possibility of experience, but by this he
meant a categorial determination. For Nancy, on the contrary, this

synthesis presupposes a deeper disclosure of world, self and com
munity involving reflective judgment, or the interpretative creation
or discovery of new modes of action, feeling, and cognition. Though

reflective judgment encompasses and even incorporates the differ
ential structure of language encapsulated in the notion of the dif
f?rend, it does not dissolve into "a play of phrases." For prior to
all decentralization judgment is determined pre-categorically by the
web of meanings comprising an ontological preunderstanding. If
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this is so, then the roots of reason reach further down into the ground

than its discursive fragmentation would indicate. Can we accept
the finality of this judgment? We can, I believe, so long as we
remember that even in our postmodern condition?a condition in
which tradition, now fragmented, has lost much of its authority?
the indeterminacy of final ends and the determinacy of finite pur
poses, the aesthetics and pragmatics of judgment, are never abso
lutely opposed, but remain aspects of one and the same Being.

Loyola University of Chicago
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